However, the approach of much of the literature on the East Asian state is based on the assumption that the state's role in the economy is different not only in its measurable extent but also, and more importantly, in its nature. The state is seen as accepting the existence of the market economy and private ownership of the means of production, but also as seeking to manipulate the incentive structure facing producers so as to bring about a different allocation of resources from that which would otherwise prevail. Of course, as far as agriculture is concerned, most governments in the world could be described in this way, but the East Asian model is further characterised according to the institutional actors involved and the methods used to 'guide' or 'govern' markets towards the achievement of what are seen as national goals. The term 'developmental state', originally coined by Chalmers Johnson to define the institutions and practices of state intervention in the industrial sector in Japan, has come to be more widely used as the means of describing such distinctive features of the state's role in the economy in East Asia, whether as the key explanation of the successful cases of industrialisation in the region or as the underlying cause of the crisis of the late 1990s.
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A number of key features are generally held to be common and crucial to the operations of the developmental states of East Asia. Within such states, it is argued, the political arm of the government interacts with interest groups to maintain political stability and secure room for manoeuvre in the actual implementation of policy, while the bureaucratic arm, usually under the direction of a particular agency within the bureaucracy ('the pilot organisation' in Johnson's terminology), is left free to adopt whatever day-to-day methods it can devise to achieve the overall goals. Although the bureaucratic agency may sometimes intervene quite directly (for example, through public ownership of production facilities) in the industrial sector which is its concern, it more commonly makes use of more indirect methods of inducing private-sector businesses to follow bureaucratic 'guidance'. These tend to involve whatever carrots (e.g., access to governmentcontrolled sources of credit) and sticks (e.g., the threat of reduced protection from domestic or international competition) the bureaucratic agency has at its disposal and are employed by means of more-or-less informal relationships between bureaucrats and the representatives of private producers. Whilst there has been much controversy as to the impact of this form of state intervention on actual economic outcomes, there has been little question that it has been widely attempted and that its institutional characteristics pervade the relationship between the state and the economy in many parts of the East Asian region.
